



The Ethics of the Digital Commons
Fuchs, Christian
 
This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of 
Media Ethics, DOI: 10.1080/23736992.2020.1736077.
The final definitive version is available online:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23736992.2020.1736077
© 2020 Taylor & Francis
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
The Ethics of the Digital Commons  
Christian Fuchs 
 
Accepted article version, published in: Journal of Media Ethics.  
Please cite using the version published in the journal 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper asks: Why is it morally good to foster the digital commons? How can we 
ethically justify the importance of the digital commons? An answer is given based on 
Aristotelian ethics. Because Alasdair MacIntyre is the most influential Aristotelian 
moral philosopher today, the paper engages with foundations of MacIntyre’s works 
and gives special attention to his concept of the common good and his analysis of 
how structures of domination damage the common good. It is argued that for 
advancing a philosophy of the (digital) commons, MacIntyre’s early and later works, 
in which he has been influenced by Karl Marx, are of particular importance. The 
approach taken in this paper combines Aristotle, Marx, and MacIntyre. 
 
This work was supported by the EU Horizon 2020 Framework Programme as part of 
the research project "netCommons: Network Infrastructure as Commons", grant 
number 688768, http://www.netcommons.eu 
 
The rise of computing and the internet in society has come along with new forms of 
commodities and commons. There is a range of digital commodities: Apple sells 
hardware such as iPhones, iPads, or Macintosh desktop computers. Internet service 
providers sell access to digital networks for mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and 
desktop computers. Microsoft sells licenses for the use of operating system software 
and application software. Google and Facebook sell targeted online advertisements. 
Spotify, Netflix, and Amazon Prime sell subscriptions to collections of digital content. 
There is also a range of digital commons: Community centers, public libraries, and 
other public institutions often provide free access to computers and the internet. 
Community networks such as Freifunk provide free access to computer networks 
that are operated and owned as a common resource in local communities. Free 
software (such as Linux, GNU, or Mozilla) is software that can be run, studied, 
distributed, and improved without restrictions. Wikipedia is a freely accessible, co-
operatively edited, nonprofit online encyclopedia. It is distributed based on a Creative 
Commons license that allows re-use and re-mixing of Wikipedia’s content. Creative 
Commons is a license that allows access to and the re-use of digital contents (such 
as images, texts, videos, music, etc.) without payment. Nonprofit open-
access journals and books make texts available in digital online formats (and in the 
case of books often as affordable paperbacks) without charging users and authors 
and without making monetary profits. 
 
Digitization fosters both new forms of commodification and co-operative production, 
distribution and ownership, which poses the ethical question of how we should best 
assess these diverging principles that operate in the online economy.  
 
This paper asks: Why is it morally good to foster the digital commons? It examines 
the ethical foundations of the commons and applies them to the realm of the digital 
commons. The focus of this article project is on Aristotelian ethics in general and 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s version of Aristotelian ethics in particular. It explores how this 
approach can be interpreted for justifying the moral need for digital commons. It 
outlines the foundations of an Aristotelian-Hegelian-Marxian digital ethics. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre and the digital commons 
 
Although Yochai Benkler does not, in general, give much attention to ethics and 
philosophy in his books on the commons, an article he wrote together with Helen 
Nissenbaum discusses “Commons-Based Peer Production and Virtue” (Benkler & 
Nissenbaum, 2006). Benkler and Nissenbaum argue that “commons-based peer 
production is an instance of an activity that not only enables the expression of 
virtuous character but serves as a training ground for virtue” and “holds the potential 
to add to the stock of opportunities for pro-social engagement” (2006, p. 414). They 
use virtue ethics for discerning four clusters of virtues that motivate commons-
based peer production. The first two clusters focus on the development of the 
commoners’ self (self-regarding virtues), the third and the fourth on the development 
of others (social virtues): 
• Autonomy 
• Creative production 
• Benevolence, charity, generosity, altruism 
• Sociability, camaraderie, friendship, co-operation, civic virtue  
(Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006, pp. 405–408). 
 
In the discussion of the second dimension, creative production, Benkler and 
Nissenbaum refer to Alasdair MacIntyre’s version of virtue ethics: “Peer production 
offers the possibility of engagement in what MacIntyre terms a ‘practice’” (2006, 
p. 406). They then cite MacIntyre’s definition of a practice as “any coherent and 
complex form of socially established human activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially derivative of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended” (2007, p. 187). However, 
Benkler and Nissenbaum do not further discuss the implications of this definition. 
A good is “what benefits human beings as such and […] what benefits human beings 
in particular roles within particular contexts of practice.” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 65) 
There are therefore individual and social goods. MacIntyre (2007, p. 291) mentions 
prestige, status, and money as examples of external goods. Internal goods arise 
directly from the experience of a practice itself (p. 292). MacIntyre relates the virtue 
concept to practices’ internal goods: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the 
possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which 
are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving 
any such goods” (p. 222). For Aristotle (2002, book II), a virtue is an active condition 
that constitutes a mean between two extremes – “a mean condition between two 
vices, one resulting from excess and the other from deficiency” (2002, § 1107a). So, 
a virtue is a means of moderation and mediation. Adorno (2001) criticizes that 
Aristotle’s ethics is conservative (see also Whyman, 2017): For Aristotle, mediation 
is “only something existing between the extremes” (Adorno, 2001, p. 47). This 
concept of mediation lacks the dialectic, in which mediation is 
“accomplished through the extremes themselves” (p. 47) and the extremes are 
sublated (aufgehoben, sublation = simultaneous substitution and elimination). So, for 
example, class struggle aims at sublating the conflict between capital and labor that 
is constituted by two opposite interests. A “mediation” of this conflict is achieved by 
mechanisms such as wage negotiations, strikes, lay-offs, rationalization, 
outsourcing, etc. Within capitalism, such mediation only settles the conflict 
temporarily closer to the interest of capital or labor and cannot overcome the 
extreme polar opposite of interests that is constitutive for capitalism itself. Sublation 
(Aufhebung) works through the extremes by constituting a new totality that is an 
emerging difference that contains the new and transformed parts of the old, 
eliminates parts of the old, and makes a qualitative difference. 
 
The problem of defining virtues as individual practices is that one can obtain internal 
excellence of a practice to perfect ways of achieving external goals that harm 
society. An example is someone who acquires outstanding free/open-
source software programming skills, uses them for building bots that tyrannize 
specific groups of internet users, and encourages others to re-use and further 
develop the evil code to create an army of nasty bots. Virtues, therefore, need to be 
situated in the context of the political and critical dimension of the quest and struggle 
for a good life (εὐδαιμονία, eudaimonia) for all. 
 
Creative production is not, as Benkler and Nissenbaum claim, a virtue in itself. It 
should not be seen independent from its content and societal context. MacIntyre 
(2007) takes this point into account by arguing that virtues do not simply focus on the 
establishment of the good life for an individual, but a community. Neo-
Aristotelians ask: “What is it that we presuppose? […] the NeoAristotelian’s history is 
a history both of her and of those groups with whom she shares common goods and 
within which she pursues her individual good” (MacIntyre, 2016, p. 61). But such 
a version of the communitarian approach is itself limited: The Nazis had the virtue of 
perfecting their methods of annihilating their constructed enemies (such as Jews), 
which was perceived as creating excellence in militarism and a good life for the 
community of Nazis. The only community at which virtues can be oriented in order 
not be repressive is the undivided community of humans. Practices can only be 
virtuous if they aim at creating the good life for all and to reduce and minimize 
suffering. Callinicos remarks that MacIntyre has a “principled preference for the local 
and particular” and “has lost interest in the search for a global alternative (literally 
and metaphorically) to capitalism” (2011, p. 77). MacIntyre (2011) answers to 
Callinicos that revolutions need to start from organizations such as “grass-
roots organizations, trade unions, cooperatives,” schools, transport systems, etc. that 
help remaking everyday life and “serve the common good” (p. 320). “For those who 
engage in such making and remaking will encounter that resistance to any breach of 
those [dominant political] norms” is what “makes revolutionaries,” a resistance for 
which “local organizations need “to find allies elsewhere, nationally and 
internationally, and often need to deal with agencies of the state or international 
agencies, sometimes as obstacles, sometimes as providing resources” (p. 320). 
Benkler and Nissenbaum argue, based on MacIntyre, that humans face structural 
constraints, which in the context of commons-based peer production means that 
“incumbent firms” (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006, p. 418) such as Microsoft tend to 
resist and oppose commons-based peer production. This argumentation implies that 
large corporations oppose the four clusters of virtues. But there is a dialectical 
complexity of the subsumption of aspects of society under capital: Capital tries to 
subsume ever newer social systems in order to create new spheres of capital 
accumulation and to circumvent crisis tendencies and forestall resistance. 
All of the virtuous practices discussed by Benkler and Nissenbaum are not 
automatically resisting the subsumption of the digital commons under capital.  
 
Someone involved in a peer production project can practice the virtues of autonomy, 
creative production, benevolence, charity, generosity, altruism, sociability, 
camaraderie, friendship, and co-operation by co-producing common resources, but 
can be subject to the exploitation of his or her labor for capital accumulation or can 
be the subject of such capital accumulation processes. Creativity, participation, 
sharing, openness, and co-operation have become new ideologies of digital 
capitalism: Digital corporations such as Facebook, Google, for-profit open access 
publishers, etc., practice the communism of capital: They advance the production of 
particularistic types of commons that are subsumed under the logic of capital. 
Facebook and Google accumulate capital through the free labor of users, who 
create, share and participate in the production of data and content on platforms that 
are open for anyone to use as a gift. An ever-larger number of companies 
crowdsources product development, improvement and marketing to the free labor of 
the online crowd of brand consumers. Corporate open-access publishers accumulate 
capital by making content available as digital commons that is only released if the 
producers pay large sums of money as processing charges that not just finance end-
production, but are also the source of corporate profits. 
 
Benkler and Nissenbaum’s four clusters of virtues of the commons are focused on 
individual and social virtues. They lack a third dimension: The dimension of collective 
political action (political virtues) that aims at creating a society of the commons and 
advancing struggles against the processes of commodification and bureaucratization 
that subsume the commons under the logics of capital and domination. In order to 
advance a critical virtue ethics of the commons one needs to add the social struggle 
for a society of the commons as a fourth dimension of virtues. 
 
Such a critical dimension of virtues can, however, only be developed based on the 
concepts of essence and human nature. The most well-known version of MacIntyre’s 
ethics is the phase, where he wrote After Virtue, in which he did not engage with the 
concept of human nature. However, in the earlier and later phases of his 
philosophical development, he was more open to Karl Marx’s critical theory that 




Burns (2011) distinguishes three subsequent stages in MacIntyre’s works that he 
terms “Marx without Aristotle,” “Aristotle without Marx,” and “Aristotle and Marx.” 
When MacIntyre (1953) published his first book Marxism: An Interpretation in 1953, 
he was “both a Christian and a Marxist” (MacIntyre, 2009, p. 419). In 1968, when 
the book’s second edition was released, he was neither a Christian nor a Marxist 
(ibid.). “During the years 1977 through 1984 MacIntyre transitioned to an Aristotelian 
worldview, returned to the Christian faith and turned from Aristotle to Thomas 
Aquinas” (Lutz, 2015). In his major work After Virtue, MacIntyre wrote in 1981 that 
Marxism was “exhausted as a political tradition” and was politically too optimistic 
(MacIntyre, 2007, p. 304). As part of his turn away from Marxism, MacIntyre gave up 
the concept of human nature (see MacIntyre, 2002, pp. 259, 261; 2007, p. 190). He 
later changed his position on that question and “became a Thomist after writing After 
Virtue” because “I became convinced that Aquinas was in some respects a better 
Aristotelian than Aristotle” (MacIntyre, 2007, p. xi). In his late works, MacIntyre has 
returned to Marx and advances a “Thomistic Aristotelianism” that is “informed by 
Marx’s insights” to construct “a contemporary politics and ethics” (MacIntyre, 2016, 
p. xi). 
 
Aristotle (1999, 1933) spoke of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (to ti ên einai) and τὸ τί ἐστι (to ti esti), 
which literally means “what it is in order to be” and “what it is.” These phrases have 
either been translated as “essence” (e.g. in Aristotle, 1933) or as “what it is for 
something to be” (Aristotle, 1999). The essence of an entity consists of “those 
characteristics that make it the kind of thing it is (or the very thing it is) and without 
which it could not exist or be what it is” (Meikle, 1985, p. 177). Aristotle (1999, 
§1029b) defines essence as that “what is said of” a thing “in its own right” 
(Aristotle, 1999, §1029b [translated as “that which it is said to be per se” in, 
Aristotle 1933, 1029b]). Essence means that something is a “primary thing” that is 
“not articulated by attributing one thing to another” (Aristotle, 1999, §1030a; 
[translated as “do not involve the predication of one thing of another” in, 
Aristotle 1933, §1029b]). The essence of a thing is “the substance which is peculiar 
to it and belongs to nothing else,” whereas “the universal is common; for by universal 
we mean that which by nature pertains to several things” (Aristotle, 1933, §1038b; 
[translation in, Aristotle 1999, §1030a: “For in the first place, the thinghood of each 
thing is what each is on its own, which does not belong to it by virtue of anything 
else, while the universal is a common property, since what is meant universally is 
what is of such a nature as to belong to more than one thing”]). Meikle (1985) 
distinguishes Aristotelian essentialism from the worldview of atomism. Ernst Bloch 
(1963, 1972) characterizes Aristotle’s concept of matter as a dynamic form of being-
in-possibility (dynámei ón, δυνɑ́μει ŏν) and objective possibility. He opposes this 
concept of matter to mechanic materialism and traces it in the works of Avicenna, 
Averroes, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Schelling, Hegel, and Marx. 
 
Justifying that the good life means a commons-based society requires reasonable 
assumptions about the nature of humans and society. MacIntyre argues in his early 
Marxist writings – especially the 1958/59 essay Notes from the Moral 
Wilderness (MacIntyre, 2009, pp. 45–68) that for Marxists the “concept of human 
nature […] has to be at the centre of any discussion of moral theory” 
(MacIntyre, 2009, p. 63). For MacIntyre, morality has to do with human desires. 
Capitalism and class societies would distort desires so that there is a “rift between 
morality and desire” (p. 61). MacIntyre here applies the Hegelian dialectical logic of 
essence and existence. Modern society would have created conditions where 
“human possibility can be realized in a quite new way” (p. 56). But these potentials 
are artificially suppressed so that they do not benefit humanity in common, but rather 
predominantly the ruling class. “Each age reveals a development of human 
potentiality which is specific to that form of social life and which is specifically limited 
by the class structure of that society” (p. 64). Each “new form of exploitation […] 
brings new frustrations of human possibility” (p. 125). “The paradox of bourgeois 
society is that it at one at the same time contains both the promise of greatly 
enlarged freedom and the denial of that freedom” (p. 126). Human nature “is violated 
by exploitation and its accompanying evils” (p. 66). Only class struggle is able to 
realize “a common shared humanity” (p. 64) and “the deeper desire to share what is 
common in humanity” and “to rediscover common desire.” (p. 65) MacIntyre argues 
that class society means alienation from common human desires for solidarity. For 
him, human essence has to do with the collective human desire for a good life for all. 
As part of his return to Marx during his late period, MacIntyre (2016, chapter 2) 
argues in his book Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity that Marx employs key 
Aristotelian concepts: “essence, potentiality, goal-directedness” (MacIntyre, 2016, 
p. 94). “For Marx, as for Aristotle, human agents can be understood only as goal-
directed, and we can distinguish between those goals the pursuit of which will 
develop their human potentiality and those goals the pursuit of which will frustrate 
their development” (p. 94). 
 
What is the role of language and communication in human nature? MacIntyre (2007, 
chapter 15) argues in After Virtue that the unity of human life can only be obtained 
through conversations that create social relations. The human being is a “story-
telling animal” (p. 250; see also the discussion in Williams, 2009). Conversations 
construct dramatic narratives that make human life unpredictable. At the same time, 
human life is guided by a telos – “a variety of ends or goals” (p. 250). Because of 
human life’s communicative character, virtue is for MacIntyre not purely internal to 
practices, but supports the “quest for the good” and “increasing knowledge of the 
good” (p. 254). MacIntyre sees the good as the search “for the good life for man” (p. 
254). This definition is unsatisfactory because the goal of what someone or a group 
understands as a good life can, for example, include the enslavement of others or 
genocide. Virtue ethics should not abstract from society as totality and not focus on 
particular communities. MacIntyre argues that the good life varies historically and 
from group to group (p. 255). Therefore, virtues oriented on the social are for 
MacIntyre limited to particular local communities. “[W]e all approach our own 
circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. […] I belong to this clan, that 
tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits 
these roles” (p. 255). The stress of “moral particularity” disregards what humans 
have in common and faces the danger of turning into moral relativism and moral 
particularism. Avoiding moral relativism requires the concept of human 
nature/essence. 
 
MacIntyre in After Virtue speaks of the “narrative understanding of the unity of 
human life” (2007, p. 265). This is just another formulation for saying that humans 
are communicative, social beings. MacIntyre does not draw the conclusion that 
communication and community are part of the human essence because in After 
Virtue he rejects the concept of human nature. His account thereby is incompletely 
Aristotelian. MacIntyre’s approach can be turned into a full Aristotelianism by adding 
the notion of human essence: Humans are in essence producing, communicative, 
social beings. Aristotle describes humans as ζῷον λόγοϛ ἔχων (zōon logon echon). 
Arendt (1958, p. 27) writes that it is inadequate to translate this category as 
a rational animal. In Greek, λόγος (logos) means both rationality/reason and 
speech/utterance. This double meaning precisely describes human essence: The 
human is a rational/teleological, communicative being. Language and work as forms 
of production are a means for reaching goals. In Politics, Aristotle writes: λόγον δὲ 
μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων – “man alone among the animals has speech” 
(Aristotle, 2013, §1253a). MacIntyre (2016, p. 26) argues that “the power of 
language use” distinguishes humans from animals. Language would have four 
crucial features: It enables reflection and justifications, enhances the communication 
of intentions and responses, makes envisioning alternative futures possible, and 
allows narrating stories (pp. 26–27). Language enables humans to pose ethical 
questions about what is good (p. 225). 
 
Language has syntactic (form, rules), semantic (meaning, content) and pragmatic 
(effect, purposeful use in social contexts) aspects. MacIntyre, in his book Dependent 
Rational Animals, discusses the example of bottlenose dolphins (1999, pp. 50–51). 
These dolphins are highly developed animals that perform perceptive learning and 
communicate intentionally with each other. They form social bonds via a range of 
whistling sounds. MacIntyre uses the example of the dolphin to show that there are 
common biological features of highly developed animals and humans. Certain 
animals (dolphins, dogs, gorillas, chimpanzees, elephants, etc.) make use of 
prelinguistic means for achieving goals. Humans in contrast to animals are able to 
use language in complex manners to “express the judgement about which the agent 
is reflecting” (p. 54), which allows them to reflect on and realize alternative actions 
(p. 96). MacIntyre calls this capacity practical rationality (p. 54). Humans are able to 
put language to reflective use (p. 58). Through communicative social relations they 
learn to evaluate, modify, and reject their judgments (p. 83) and to reflectively 
organize desires and the quest for wants and needs in order to achieve a variety of 
goods (p. 96). Humans are therefore also moral beings that live through 
communication: “As a practical reasoner, I have to engage in conversation with 
others, conversation about what it would be best for me or them or us to do here and 
now, or next week, or next year” (pp. 110–111). For achieving the common good, 
humans have to not just communicate, but also need to co-operate (p. 114). 
So, humans strive to achieve individual and common goods by reflective and 
anticipatory judgment, learning through communicating judgments, practically 
enacting and modifying their judgments in everyday life, and working together with 
others. MacIntyre outlines common features of humans, but avoids speaking of 
“human essence.” MacIntyre outlines a logic of essence but does not call it by this 
name. There are parallels of MacIntyre to Hegel, Marx, and Marcuse’s concepts of 
essence (Wesen in German), which is why we should have a closer look at these 
thinker’s works. 
 
The German word Wesen has two meanings: It means a) a creature or being; and b) 
in a philosophical sense the particular features of a phenomenon that make it 
different from other phenomena and constitute the grounding and inner 
characteristics of something without which it could not exist (Duden, 2019). 
Therefore, the two key English translations of Wesen are a) creature/being and b) 
essence (Langenscheidt, 2019). Especially Hegel advanced the philosophical notion 
of Wesen by creating a dialectical logic of essence. For Hegel (1830/1991, §§115-
130), essence is the ground of existence. He speaks of a dialectic of essence 
(Wesen) and appearance (Erscheinung), which means that the essence of 
something that exists is not always immediately apparent. “The immediate being of 
things is […] a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed” 
(Hegel, 1830/1991, Addition to §112). Actuality (Wirklichkeit) is for Hegel the 
dialectical sublation and unity of the contradiction between essence and appearance. 
“Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence and existence” 
(Hegel, 1830/1991, §142). Actuality is a reasonable being, being not as it is 
immediately, but the way it can and should be so that it accords to the potentials 
inherent in its essence. 
 
Herbert Marcuse (1936/2009) argues that Marx was heavily influenced by Hegel’s 
dialectical logic of essence. Marx “works with two different sets of concepts, […] One 
set describes the economic process in its immediate appearance. […] the second 
group of concepts, which has been derived from the totality of the social dynamic, is 
intended to grasp the essence and the true content of the manifestations which the 
first group describes as they appear. The dialectical concepts transcend given social 
reality in the direction of another historical structure which is present as a tendency 
in the given reality” (Marcuse, 1936/2009, pp. 62–63). Marx dialectically relates the 
two meanings of Wesen in his critical analysis of society and capitalism. On the one 
hand, Marx speaks of humans as species-being (Gattungswesen), by 
which he means that humans are producing, co-operative, social and societal 
beings. “[P]roduction is his active species-being” (Marx, 1844d, p. 277). The human 
species-being’s “species-powers” lie in “the co-operative action of all [hu]mankind” 
(Marx, 1844d, p. 333). The human being is “a societal animal” (“gesellschaftliches 
Tier,” translation from German, Marx, 1857/58, p. 84). 
 
For Marx, socialness is the essence of human beings. He argues that in capitalism 
and class society, human socialness is crippled and incomplete. He expresses this 
circumstance with the notion of alienation/estrangement (Entfremdung). Marx argues 
that human beings’ “social activity” has the potential to create “the true community” 
of humanity, […] but as long as man does not recognize himself as man, and 
therefore has not organized the world in a human way, this community appears in 
the form of estrangement, because its subject, man, is a being estranged from 
himself” (Marx, 1844b, p. 217). In Marx’s original German manuscript, the phrase 
“true community” is “das wahre Gemeinwesen der Menschen” (Marx, 1844a, p. 451). 
The passage can best be translated as “the true commonwealth of humanity.” 
But Gemeinwesen also has the word Wesen in it. The etymology of the word goes 
back to the combination of the two German words gemein (common) 
and Wesen (essence)1. For Marx, the use of the term Gemeinwesen refers to the 
common as communist existence of humans and the commons as essence of 
humanity and society. So what Marx hints at in this and other passages is that class 
society alienates humans from the potential of the common control of society, 
a commons-based society. 
 
In a passage in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx directly refers to 
communism as the actuality of society that realizes the essence of the human being 
and society. Marx writes that communism is “the positive transcendence of private 
property as human self-estrangement” and therefore “the real appropriation of 
the human essence [“wirkliche Aneignung des menschlichen Wesens” in the 
German original – Marx (1844e, p. 536)] by and for man;” communism therefore is 
“the complete return of man to himself as a social (i. e., human) being,” “equals 
humanism” and is “the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, 
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, 
between the individual and the species” (1844d, p. 296). In this passage, Marx 
dialectically links the notion of Wesen as being and essence. Marx sees the 
                                                        
1 1See: Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm 
Grimm, http://woerterbuchnetz.de (accessed on September 9, 2019): entry for “Gemeinwesen.” 
commons as human essence, from which human beings are alienated in class 
societies. Communism sublates this antagonism between human essence and 
existence. 
MacIntyre (2016) does not determine what the common aspects of the four 
dimensions of linguistic capacities that he identifies are, although he hints at the fact 
that language and communication “make possible kinds of cooperation and forms of 
association that are distinctively human” (p. 26) and “enable us to associate 
cooperatively with others in ways not open to nonhuman animals” (p. 29): Humans 
produce social relations and produce in social relations. And they do so purposefully; 
namely, to with the capacity of trying to advance human flourishing. Class relations 
and dominations, however, influence the perception of which human individuals and 
groups should flourish and which ones should be harmed as well as corresponding 
practices. 
 
For Aristotle, human life in society has a telos. Influenced by Aristotle and Marx, 
Georg Lukács argues that the human being is a teleological being because the 
human as “conscious creator” produces with a purpose, orientation and goal (1978, 
p. 5). Lukács sees teleological positing as the essence of the human being and 
society. Human beings are in essence teleological: They work and communicate to 
reach defined goals. Aristotle argues that “one who makes something always makes 
it for the sake of something” (2002, §1139b). Lukács' combination of Aristotle and 
Marx shows that without production and communication there can be no human 
existence. Communication is the production of social relations and sociality. Work 
and communication are two aspects of production: Humans produce meanings and 
sociality through communication. They produce use-values that satisfy human wants, 
needs, and desires through work. Work has a communicative character and 
communication work character. Work and communication are two dialectically 
encroaching dimensions of the practical, anticipatory, and reflective rationality of 
human beings. Production in society is social and therefore communicative. 
Communication is productive: It creates shared understandings and sociality. 
Communication and work are common features of all humans and all societies. To 
attain desires and satisfy needs, we need to engage in production and 
communication so that immediate desires are suppressed and rationally transformed 
into work processes that allows attaining identified ends having to do with ways of 
how we can achieve wants, needs, and desires. Production and communication 
require “intellect fused with desire” and “desire fused with thinking” (Aristotle, 2002, 
§1139b). Humans can “stand back from our desires and other motives” 
(MacIntyre, 2016, p. 44) to reflect and rationally act so that we achieve larger goals 
or what MacIntyre (2016, p. 53) characterizes as the “final end” and the “ultimate 
human end,” the human flourishing and good life that Aristotle characterizes 
as eudaimonia. This means that humans have an essential quest for human 
flourishing and being able to lead a good life. If humans, in essence, desire the good 
life and are rational, communicating, producing, social and societal animals who 
cannot achieve goals alone but only together with others; then, the question arises 
how humans can advance the common good in society. 
 
The common good 
 
MacIntyre (1997) argues that the common good can be defined either as the end of 
community members’ “shared activities” (p. 239), or as the sum of individual goods in 
an association (pp. 239–240), or as activities in a polis, where individual and 
common goods are inseparable (p. 241). For MacIntyre, both the first 
(communitarian) and the second (liberal) concept fail because in the modern state, 
liberal individualist and minimalist concepts and elements of the common good come 
into conflict with the social good that is based on a communitarian concept of the 
common good. MacIntyre recommends “small-scale local community politics” (p. 
248) that enables “a community of enquiry and learning” (p. 251). MacIntyre does not 
take into account that the common good understood as a “community in which each 
individual’s achievement of her or his own good is inseparable both from achieving 
the shared goods of practices from contributing to the common good of the 
community as a whole” (pp. 240–241) relates not just to local community practices, 
but also to practices that concern humanity as a whole, i.e. practices that either 
affect all humans or that are common to all humans. The common good certainly 
needs to take into account politics (the polis as a political community) and culture 
(common learning). Another important dimension is the common in the economy 
(common production, common ownership, common access). 
 
MacIntyre (2016) gives a range of examples for work toward the common good at 
the local level. “The common good of those at work together are achieved in 
producing goods and services that contribute to the life of the community and in 
becoming excellent at producing them” (MacIntyre, 2016, p. 170). Family members 
“pursue their goods as family members by enabling the other through their affection 
and understanding to achieve her or his goods. Parents pursue their goods as family 
members by fostering the development of the powers and virtues of their children, so 
that those children may emerge from adolescence as independent rational agents” 
(p. 169). In schools, teachers “achieve their own good qua teachers and contribute to 
that common good by making the good of their students their overriding good, while 
their students contribute to the shared education of their class by their class 
participation, so achieving their own good.” 
 
Humans are rational, ethical, communicating, producing, social and societal beings 
who behave purposefully to try to achieve a good life. Aristotle saw that there is an 
inherent connection of the commons, communication and community.  
 
Communication creates common meanings and definitions within a community. In 
modern class societies, the common good is subordinated under the logics of capital 
and bureaucracy. As a result, particularistic interests rule so that inequalities and 
asymmetric distributions of power are a reality. The good life is not an actual 
common feature of all humans living in capitalism and class societies, where it is 
only a feature that some enjoy at the expense of others: Some are forced by 
economic, political or ideological structures to lead damaged, alienated lives. The 
commons are part of the human essence because the common features of all 
humans constitute human essence. The desire for a good life is a common feature of 
all humans. But given that humans are social beings living in society, the good life 
cannot be achieved individually, but only collectively, socially and politically. I can 
only lead a good life if all are enabled to lead good lives. A good society is a society 
that corresponds to human essence, i.e. a society of the commons, in which humans 
control the economic, the political and the cultural system, goods and structures that 
together form a society in common so that everyone is empowered to lead a good 
life. A good society is a society of the commons. Alienation, in contrast, means that 
humans are not in control of economic, political and cultural structures that shape life 
in society. 
 
Aristotle distinguishes between distributive, corrective, reciprocal and universal 
justice (that advances the common good) (McCarthy, 1990, chapter 2). Justice and 
injustice are for Aristotle matters of proportionality and disproportionality. An “unjust 
person has more, while the one to whom injustice is done has less of something 
good” (Aristotle, 2002, §1131b). Injustice means that someone has “an excess for 
oneself of what is simply beneficial and a deficiency of what is harmful” (§1134a). So 
Aristotle argues that injustice means that a certain individual, group or class has 
a kind of surplus control of a good over others. He anticipates Marx concept of 
surplus-value, but defines the excess he speaks of as a more general form of 
injustice that arises from the asymmetric distribution of power that benefits the few at 
the expense of the many. Marx stresses that Aristotle was the first thinker who 
analyzed the commodity’s value-form (1867, pp. 73–74). According to Marx, Aristotle 
was a genius because he saw that the value of commodities is a relation of equality. 
But given that Aristotle did not live in a capitalist society, he was not able to see that 
this equality is the effect of the objectification of specific quanta of labor in the 
commodity. 
 
Aristotle (2002) not just opposes injustice to justice, but also to friendship and love, 
which are social relations where humans benefit and do good things for others 
without instrumental interests. The common arises from friendship and community: 
In “every sort of community there seems to be something just, and also friendship. 
[…] To whatever extent that they share something in common, to that extent is there 
a friendship, since that too is the extent to which there is something just. And the 
proverb ‘the things of friends are common’ is right, since friendship consist in 
community. All things are common to brothers and comrades” (§1159b). The political 
community aims at an advantage “that extends to all of life” (§1160a). Aristotle 
(2013, §1279a) terms a community where “the multitude governs with a view to the 
common advantage” polity. 
 
Marx is an Aristotelian in respect to the good life as the realization of human 
potentiality. Aristotle (1999, §1048a) sees potentiality as being “capable of 
something” and being “capable of causing motion.” Potency is also the source of 
dialectic because whatever is potential “is itself capable of opposite effects” 
(Aristotle, 1999, §1051a). In communism, the full potentials of human beings and 
society are actualized. Marx defines communism as a just society based on the 
commons, friendships and love in Aristotle’s understanding. One of Marx’s 
achievements was that he uncovered how class societies in general and capitalism 
in particular structurally institutionalize the exploitation of labor and the injustices 
Aristotle spoke of. In essence, humans are co-operative, social, societal beings, who 
strive for solidarity and a good life. A particular societal condition enables or hinders 
the realization of society’s and human potentials. Such potentials develop 
historically. If class structures and domination cause society’s essence and 
existence to diverge, then humans ought to organize collectively and struggle 
against alienation in order to realize a good society. Marx calls the good society 
“communism.” His approach is teleological because humans have the potential to 
struggle for a good society. If they do so, then their social action becomes 
teleological – it becomes praxis, political action for the good society. Marx’s 
Aristotelianism becomes evident when he argues that “our species-being […] is not 
actualised as energeia in the context of private property” (Groff, 2015, p. 316). In his 
political-economic works, Marx analyses the alienation of the human being from the 
essence of its species-being as abstract labor’s creation of surplus-value, i.e. the 
exploitation of labor in class relations. The “proposition that man’s species-nature is 
estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of 
them is from man’s essential nature” (Marx, 1844d, p. 277). The German term for 
species-being is Gattungswesen (Marx, 1844e, p. 518), a combination of species 
(Gattung) and the dual meaning of Wesen as essence/being. So, by species-
being, Marx means human essence or what all human beings have in common.  
 
Capitalism and class constitute the alienation of the human from its social essence. 
The commons are goods that all humans require to live a good life. The good life of 
the individual is only possible in a good society that enables the good life for all. 
Achieving a good society that benefits all requires the collective organization of the 
common good. It requires inclusive, co-operative communication. If structures of 
domination damage certain groups so that they are compelled to live alienated lives, 
then the common good is not realized. The good society is then only a good society 
for some – it is a class society. Establishing a good life, therefore, requires struggles 
and practices that are guided by “the categorical imperative to overthrow all 
relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” 
(Marx, 1844c, p. 182). Without being able to live a good life in a society of the 
commons, humans are not fully developed humans – their existence does not 
correspond to their essence because they are denied those common goods that 
humans and society require to flourish and thereby realize their potentials. 
 
MacIntyre argues in his later works that capitalism damages human life in multiple 
respects. Financial and educational inequalities would result in political inequalities 
(MacIntyre, 2016, p. 127). Capitalism alienates human life in manifold respects. As 
a consequence, the institutions of the market, the state and morality shape human 
wants so that what individuals “want is what the dominant social institutions have 
influenced them to want” (MacIntyre, 2016, p. 167). MacIntyre (1999, p. 156) argues 
that we can only achieve the common good if our “social relationships of giving and 
receiving” are governed by “social and political forms” that advance the common 
good. He argues that three conditions must be fulfilled: 1) institutionalized forms of 
deliberation are needed so that “shared rational deliberation” allows taking common 
decisions; 2) justice needs to be enabled so that each is working and giving 
“according to her or his ability” and each receives “so far as is possible, according to 
her or his needs” (1 p. 30), which would have to especially take into account “those 
who are most dependent and in most need of receiving – children, the old, the 
disabled” (p. 130); 3) everyone should “have a voice” in the community (p. 130).  
 
Taken together, such a society of the commons advances the political commons 
(participatory democracy), the economic commons (wealth and self-fulfillment for all), 
and the cultural commons (voice and recognition of all). It requires to overcome 
political alienation (domination), economic alienation (exploitation), and cultural 
alienation (ideology). MacIntyre (2016) argues that achieving the common good in 
communities such as families, workplaces, schools, or a political system depends on 
the availability of resources such as money, power, wealth, education/skills, and 
public goods provided by the government (the education system, law, order, health 
care, transport, communications, etc.). Capitalism is not just an economic system, 
but a type of society, in which the accumulation of money, power, and reputation 
results in structures that benefit certain groups at the expense of others: “The 
exploitative structures of both free market and state capitalism make it often difficult 
and sometimes impossible to achieve the goods of the workplace through excellent 
work. The political structures of modern states that exclude most citizens from 
participation in extended and informed deliberation on issues of crucial importance to 
their lives make it often difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve the goods of 
the local community. The influence of Morality in normative and evaluative thinking 
makes it often difficult and sometimes impossible for the claims of the virtues to be 
understood, let alone acknowledge in our common lives” (pp. 237–238). 
Given that humans are storytelling animals, they can learn “to live against the 
cultural grain” and “to act as economic, political, and moral antagonists of the 
dominant order” from “the stories of those who in various very different modern 
social contexts have discovered what hat to be done, if essential human goods were 
to be achieved, and what the virtues therefore required of them, so making 
themselves into critics and antagonists of the established order” (MacIntyre, 2016, 
p. 238). Resistance and social struggle require the communication of stories about 
how domination damages human life and how resistance is possible. 
 
The digital commons and morality 
 
The outcome of the discussion in this project is that only a society that fosters the 
common good for all is a society appropriate to human beings, a morally and 
politically just society. If ethics is consciousness and action-oriented on the social 
struggle for a free society, then ethics aims at the point at which the “struggle for 
liberation changes dialectically into freedom” (Lukács, 1971, p. 42). In such 
struggles, individuals overcome the isolation, separation, alienation and partiality of 
their existence imposed by domination. They organize as political collectives that 
strive for freedom. “Praxis becomes the form of action appropriate to the isolated 
individual, it becomes his ethics” (Lukács, 1971, p. 19). 
 
Computers and computer networks enable new ways of organizing information, 
communication, and co-operation. Given that computing has become a central 
resource in modern society, the use of computers for organizing cognition, 
communication, and co-operation has become part of human needs. Humans have 
certain cognitive needs (such as being loved and recognized), communicative needs 
(such as friendships and community) and co-operative needs (such as working 
together with others in order to achieve common goals) in all types of society. In 
a digital and information society, computers are a vital means for realizing such 
needs. But given that computers are always used in societal contexts, computer use 
as such does not necessarily foster the good life, but can also contribute to 
damaging human lives. When it was shown in the Cambridge Analytica scandal that 
Facebook and other social media have been used for targeting users with fake news 
to try to manipulate elections, it became evident how a specific organization societal 
context of online platforms – namely the combination of digital capitalism, 
authoritarian politics and neoliberalism – threatens the common political good of 
democracy. Advancing the good life for all with the help of computers requires 
a particular organization and design of computing resources and society.  
 
Combining insights from Aristotle, Karl Marx, and Alasdair MacIntyre helps us to 
argue why advancing the digital commons is morally important. Humans are in 
essence moral, rationally producing, communicating, social and societal beings, who 
can only achieve their goals in relation to other humans. We can only achieve 
individual goals together with others. If achieving individual goals damages the life of 
others by exploiting or dominating them, then the common good is damaged 
because society will entail groups of humans who are compelled to lead damaged 
lives. A good society enables the good life for all. It is a commons-based society. In 
what contexts do computers help to advance the good life or damaged lives? This 
question can be answered in respect to the use of computers at the level of society, 
i.e., applications of computing resources that affect all members of society. The 
important criterion for assessing computing ethically is if, how and to which degree 
computers are used for advancing a good economic, political and culture life for all or 
are used for damaging economic, political, and cultural lives. 
 
The economy has to do with questions of production and ownership. As economic 
beings, humans strive for a life that guarantees the satisfaction of their needs and 
allows self-fulfilling work. If computer resources that are vital for the life of all are 
commodities, then the lives of humans are negatively impeded in two ways: 1) many 
commodities are produced by human labor that is exploited in class relations so that 
ownership is transferred from the immediate producers to private property holders, 
who obtain benefits at the expense of workers; 2) goods and services that are 
exchanged as commodities will inevitably exclude those who cannot afford them 
from access. Given that exchange is always an unequal exchange, commodity-
producing societies advance distributive injustice. Wikipedia as digital commons is 
preferable to a for-profit online encyclopedia that sells access to articles in two 
respects: 1) a for-profit encyclopedia will tend to rely on the exploitation of the human 
labor of digital workers who write or contribute to encyclopedia articles in order to 
create profits; 2) charging access to encyclopedic resources will exclude humans 
from access. Exploitation of digital labor and denial of access to key digital resources 
damage the lives of humans economically. The digital commons are in contrast to 
digital capital inclusive and not class-based. 
 
An increasing number of for-profit companies rely on pseudo-commons to produce 
digital capital. They provide free access to certain digital resources, crowdsource 
human labor so that it is performed online and unpaid, and accumulate capital in 
ways that prevent humans from experiencing their exploitation in an immediate 
manner. The digital commons thereby become subsumed under digital capitalism 
(see Birkinbine, 2020). Advancing the digital commons, therefore, not just needs to 
entail advancing and supporting projects that foster the digital commons, but also to 
struggle against digital capital that disguises itself as digital commons. Advancing the 
digital commons in a capitalist society as transcendent projects that prefigure an 
alternative mode of society faces the problem that humans in capitalism depend on 
wages to survive. The digital commons challenge digital capital and along with it to 
a certain degree also forms of wage-labor subsumed under digital capital. Advancing 
the digital commons as a class struggle project, therefore, requires mechanisms that 
guarantee that humans obtain income to survive and at the same time are 
empowered to act as digital communards. Mechanisms that tackle this problem 
include public/commons-partnerships, collective funding mechanisms, participatory 
budgeting, the taxation of corporations to fund alternative media projects, or basic 
income. 
Using computing resources for fostering the political good requires the support of 
projects that aim at using digital resources for advancing participatory democracy. 
Participatory democracy aims at forms of empowerment that include all to 
a meaningful degree in political decision-making and foster a public sphere, where 
inclusive, sustained political debate is possible and is not limited by hierarchies that 
are based on the unequal control of wealth, power, skills, and reputation. 
As cultural beings, humans strive for recognition. In the realm of online culture, 
Twitter is an example of a platform that humans use to make meaning of 
contemporary societies. But voice, visibility, reputation, and recognition are 
unequally distributed on Twitter: Whereas the average Twitter-user has 
707 followers,2 the singers Katy Perry and Justin Bieber were in July 2018 
with 110 million followers the two users with the largest amount of followers. 
Celebrities and corporations have a much higher online visibility, attention, voice, 
reputation and recognition and therefore also more definition power on the internet 
than everyday users. The asymmetric distribution of voice and visibility damages 
human lives because it denies humans the capacities for recognition and influencing 
collective meaning-making processes in society. The result are cultural hierarchies, 
in which influencers have much more power to be heard and shape worldviews than 
everyday people. 
 
Digital media that help fostering the cultural good help all humans to make their 
voices heard, to achieve common understandings, and to achieve recognition. 
Humans all strive for recognition, but have different worldviews, identities, and 
lifestyles. A common culture is not a unitary culture, but one that constructs the unity 
in the diversity of worldviews, ways of life and identities that are needed for respect 
and understanding. A common culture avoids both the extremes of cultural 
imperialism (unity without diversity) and cultural relativism (diversity without unity). 
 
This paper proposes a typology that is structured along with the three realms of 
society (economy, politics, culture), which allows distinguishing between three types 
of commons and three types of digital commons. The commons are the Aristotelian-
Marxian vision of a good society. They form the essence of society, which means 
that the digital commons are part of digital society’s essence. This project discussed 
earlier that for Hegel and Marx, the essence is often hidden behind false 
appearances and that actuality means the correspondence of essence and 
appearance. An Aristotelian-Hegelian-Marxian perspective on the digital commons, 
therefore, needs to distinguish between the essence of digital society and the false 
appearance and existence of digital society as a digital class society and digital 
capitalism. Class society is the false condition of society-in-general. Digital class 
society is the false condition of digital society. An Aristotelian-Hegelian-
Marxian ethics of the commons need to not just have a vision of a good digital 
society, but is also a critique of digital capitalism and digital alienation. In digital 
capitalism, critical ethical praxis takes on three forms: 
 
• Critical digital theory: In the realm of academia, research and intellectual 
life, Aristotelian-Hegelian-Marxian ethics challenges theories and approaches 
                                                        
2 https://www.brandwatch.com/blog/44-twitter-stats/, accessed on July 1, 2018.  
that fetishize and justify digital exploitation and digital domination and that 
fetishize instrumental reason, quantification, and calculation (Fuchs, 2017a). It 
generates systematic knowledge that wants to inform and empower class 
struggles against digital alienation and for a commons-based digital society, 
where all humans benefit from digital technologies. 
• Critical digital education: In the realm of education, Aristotelian-Hegelian-
Marxian ethics challenges the pure focus on teaching quantitative skills 
(STEM: science, technology, engineering, mathematics) that aim at turning 
education into an instrument of digital capital’s innovation and capital 
accumulation strategies and envisions all young learners as future 
entrepreneurs. It also challenges the metrification of education itself. In 
contrast, such an ethics fosters critical education that empowers humans’ 
critical reason so that they are able to reflect on the complexities and causes 
of digital society’s problems and understand the roots of digital capitalism’s 
contradictions. 
• Digital class struggles: In the realm of politics, Aristotelian-Hegelian-
Marxian ethics empowers humans to challenge digital alienation and to 
support and engage in class struggles that aim at establishing a fair, just and 
good digital society of the commons, where all benefit. Class struggles are 
struggles for the control of economic resources, working conditions, economic 
decisions. In digital capitalism, class struggles have two digital aspects: a) 
workers in the digital industry face precarity and exploitation and organize 
collectively in order to struggle against exploitation; b) class struggles in 
general use digital means of communication for their organization and for 
public communication. 
 
Critical digital praxis challenges digital alienation. Establishing alternatives to 
domination and exploitation in the age of digital capitalism requires a theory that 
unmasks ideology and opens up visions for a society of the digital commons, 
educational efforts that empower humans to critically understand and challenge 
digital alienation, and social struggles that establish alternative digital media and 
whose aim is a society that benefits all. These three levels of praxis are intertwined. 
Conclusion 
 
A contemporary Aristotelian-Hegelian-Marxist digital media ethics is based on the 
insight that fostering the digital commons is a way for advancing the common good 
and a good life for all humans. Virtuous commoners challenge, criticize, struggle 
against and aim to abolish digital resources that advance exploitation (economic 
alienation), authoritarianism (political alienation) and ideology (cultural alienation).  
 
Their goal is to advance digital commons in a society of the commons so that 
economic, political, and cultural power are distributed in ways that benefit all. 
Communication requires community and the commons. A fully communicative 
society – a communication society that corresponds to human essence – is 
a community of commoners, a commons-based society, where the common good 
helps advancing individual goods and humans in pursuing individual goods help 
advancing the common good. The ethics of digital commons are not independent of 
the ethics of the commons. In order to advance the digital commons, we need to 
advance toward a society of the commons in general that forms the context for the 
digital commons. Struggles for advancing the digital commons have to struggle for 
a commons-based society. 
 
James M. Moor (1998/2000) asks what Aristotle would do if he were alive today and 
a computing professional. Aristotle would not just be an active contributor and 
supporter of Wikipedia and other digital commons-projects, he would program free 
software and create digital commons that are used in collective political struggles 
against digital capitalism and digital domination because he would view such 
structures as forms of oppression that limit human potentials, damage the good life 
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